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Weathering the Storm of Austerity
Deirdre Lillis
Abstract
Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) collaborate with public funding and quality assurance agencies to
balance programme delivery with funding and quality. After the financial crisis in 2008, many
countries are now emerging from economic recessions, providing an opportunity to reflect on how
HEIs have weathered the storm of austerity. During the period 2008 and 2015 overall funding to
publically funded Irish HEIs fell by 14% despite enrolment of full-time students increasing by 25%
(HEA, 2015). Against the backdrop of a national Strategy for higher Education reform, the strategic
choices made by HEIs are considered along with the effectiveness of quality assurance systems to flag
issues with quality in a timely fashion. Initial findings suggest that (i) on the surface at least, Irish
HEIs may have weathered the storm and preserved the quality of their teaching mission, but the true
cost of this is not yet known (ii) there was a lack of strategic prioritisation in the choices made by HEIs
and a lack of realism in the development trajectories agreed with their funding agency and (iii) there
are deficits in the capacity of quality frameworks to flag quality issues in a timely fashion.
1. Introduction
Ireland provides an interesting study of a higher education system undergoing reform and
rationalisation at a time when demographic demand is increasing. Prior to the global financial crisis in
2008, Irish expenditure on higher education was slightly less than the EU average and Irish graduates
were considered some of the most employable in Europe (Aubyn et al. 2009). After the crisis, Ireland
still has one of the highest educational participation rates in the world (OECD, 2015) and Ireland’s
higher education system is still ranked in the Top 8 countries in the world (IMD, 2014).
Public funding of higher education was reduced by 14%, and the state grant by 38%, despite the
enrolment of full-time students increasing by 25% (HEA, 2015). Despite the increasing pressure on
finances, between 2008/09 and 2014/15 there was been remarkably little public out-cry, student
protests or industrial relations disputes. During this period a national strategy for higher education was
being implemented (HEA, 2011) to rationalise the sector through mergers of Institutes of Technology
and consolidation of smaller institutions into Universities. A process was also established by which
some Institutes could pursue Technological University status.
The Higher Education Authority (HEA), while acknowledging that there has been a ‘managed decline’
in the sector, has stated publicly that “There have been no serious issues flagged in the quality of
provision” (HEA, 2015), attributing this to commendable institutional responses and to the flexibility
of staff. It cited assurances provided by the national Quality and Qualifications Agency (QQI). This is
at odds with internal quality reviews of academic departments, in some internal student and staff
satisfaction surveys, trade union campaigns and opinion pieces in newspapers. This evidence, albeit
anecdotal in some cases, paints a different picture of overcrowded classrooms, increased staff
workloads, antiquated equipment and curtailed programme delivery. One inescapable fact however is
the sustained downward trajectory of Irish HEIs on world higher education rankings.
This paper focuses on the teaching mission and on responses within HEIs to cuts in core pay and nonpay funding. It does not consider capital investments or research funding. The questions addressed by
this paper include whether the guardians of the higher education system are in denial about the impacts
of funding cuts and whether we can believe their assertions that there are no serious issues with
quality. More fundamentally it asks whether the processes used to assess quality are fit for purpose. It
considers whether there is an inherent resiliency within HEIs to funding cuts and if so, how this might
manifest itself. Finally it considers whether the information published about HEIs is sufficient to allow
external stakeholders to make their own judgments on quality. Providing some insights to these
questions will contribute to the theme of higher education governance in an age of collaborative
working by providing insights into the partnership between HEIs, funding and quality assurance
agencies.
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1.1 Funding Context
Funding of higher education in Ireland is predominantly through public funding administered by the
HEA. It has three major components: institutional funding, capital funding, and research funding.
Institutional funding, the focus of this paper, is informed by a formula based unit cost calculation
(termed RGAM) and a grant is made in lieu of undergraduate tuition fees. The number of enrolled
students therefore is by far the most important determinant of Institutional budget. There has been a
decline in the overall income per student of 22% since 2008 (HEAa, 2015) (Figure 1) and between
2008 and 2013 staffing cuts are estimated at 12% across the higher education sector (Figure 2) with a
27% reduction in the Staff: Student ratio (HEAa, 2015). There has been almost no significant capital
investment in the sector (with the exception of the DIT Grangegorman campus project) and the HEA
estimates that a capital investment of €5.8 billion needed over 10 years estimated as 40% of space
requires major repair or replacement (HEA, 2015).
2. Research Methodology
Of 23 publically funded HEIs in Ireland, eight are selected for in-depth consideration with a focus on
their teaching mission. These include (i) five HEIs in the Dublin region including University College
Dublin and Dublin City University, Dublin Institute of Technology, the Institute of Technology
Blanchardstown and the Institute of Technology Tallaght1 and (ii) Three HEIs in the South including
University College Cork, Cork Institute of Technology and the Institute of Technology in Tralee.
These Institutes of Technology were selected as all have stated ambitions to become Technological
Universities under the national higher education strategy. The timeline is considered in four stages as
illustrated below in Table 1 and in Figure 3.
Period
PreCrisis
Levels
Initial
Impact
Managed
Decline
Strategic
Dialogue

Table 1 Timeline under consideration 2007/08 to 2015/16
Years
Description
2008/09
Celtic-Tiger economic boom period
2009/10
2010/112012/13
2013/142015/16

First year where emergency financial measures and public
sector staffing restrictions impacted HEI funding and staffing
Three-year period, after initial shock, of incremental
budgetary cutbacks and pay/productivity agreements. These
are fully considered in (Lillis & Morgan, 2012).
Implementation of strategic dialogue process between HEIs
and HEA.

Publically available information from various sources was used in the analysis. Reports from the
primary quality assurance process, the QQI Institutional Reviews and publically available internal
reviews are analysed to determine the responsiveness of the quality assurance framework to flag issues
about quality. The national student survey for 2013, 2014 and 2015 was considered
(www.studentsurvey.ie) as was the Times Higher Education international ranking (Times Higher,
2015). The choices that HEIs could have made are considered, noting the constraints that HEIs work
under (e.g. a high percentage of a HEI’s costs are fixed in the pay budget for permanent staff). The
strategic choices the HEIs planned to make are considered using their 2011/12 profiles as a baseline
and the Performance Compact (2014-2016) agreed as part of the Strategic Dialogue with the HEA in
2012.
3. Responsiveness of Quality Assurance Frameworks
Quality in higher education is a multi-dimensional concept. The first question considered is whether it
is possible to determine from publically available information whether there are issues with the quality

1 Dublin	
  Institute	
  of	
  Technology,	
  Institute	
  of	
  Technology	
  Blanchardstown	
  and	
  Institute	
  of	
  Technology,	
  Tallaght	
  are	
  on	
  a	
  trajectory	
  to	
  merge	
  into	
  an	
  
‘expanded	
  DIT’.
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of teaching and/or the learning experience in Irish HEIs. The primary vehicle for oversight of quality
in the university and Institute of Technology sector in Ireland is a five-yearly external institutional
review process, which is undertaken by Quality and Qualifications Ireland. It should be noted that QQI
2
itself was being established in late 2012 as a merger of four agencies .
A stark finding is that during the “Managed Decline” period when the impacts of the most dramatic
funding cuts were taking effect, Irish HEIs were not subject to external quality oversight. Instead the
newly formed national quality assurance agency was engaged in policy development mode3 for a new
institutional review process during this period. A second area of concern is the nature of the
institutional review process itself. Unlike audit-based systems, institutional reviews in Ireland during
the 2008-2012 period focused on quality enhancement4 and reviewed a HEI’s quality assurance
processes against the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance5. This is based on the
premise that if these QA processes are in place within a HEI, issues with ‘actual quality’ will surface
and be addressed by the HEI itself. The new Cyclical Review policy 2015 continues in this vein for
example citing objectives, which include encouraging a QA culture and facilitating quality
enhancement. It begs the question where an independently verifiable assessment of actual quality is
undertaken (as opposed a HEIs self-regulation of its quality).
Institutional reviews of 5 HEIs (UCC, UCD, DIT, CIT, ITB) whose on-site panel visit was undertaken
during the ‘managed decline’ period were analysed from the perspective of whether the published
6
documentation flagged issues, or noted the potential for diminished quality. It is remarkable that the
high level recommendations of these five reports make no mention of concerns about the quality of
teaching and/or the student experience arising from the financial environment. For example, UCC’s
panel report makes no mention of the impact of the financial environment on quality, despite the
University’s clear statement that there had been an almost 50% reduction in state funding, that student
numbers had increased and there had been significant negative impacts from the Employment Control
Framework.
In the wider public sector management literature, Pollitt and Bouckaert provide a mechanism by which
outcomes of activities can be categorized on the basis of the extent to which the result is evaluable.
Results can be categorised as operational, process, capacity or ideological (Pollitt and Bouckaert,
2004). Table 2 illustrates how these can be adapted for Higher Education (Lillis, 2012). It is arguable
that issues with actual quality would typically arise at an operational level however the analysis of the
institutional review reports illustrates that almost all recommendations relate to ‘process-level’ or
‘capacity level improvements’ (e.g. improvements in quality assurance processes). In a period of
austerity and in the absence of other independently verifiable assessments of actual quality, it calls into
question whether the institutional review process is fit for purpose, relying as it does on the HEIs
themselves to deal with issues with actual quality. Other key stakeholders in the sector rely upon the
QQI’s assessment of the sector.
4. The Student Voice
From a student perspective, funding impacts may manifest themselves in many ways, some disciplinespecific, including less individual staff/student interaction, less choice available in programmes,
reduced contact hours, less practical content, outdated equipment in labs and larger class sizes. Most
HEIs conduct their own internal student feedback surveys and a standardized national survey of third
level students in Ireland (ISSE) was conducted as a pilot for the first time in 20137. A key result is that
participating students rated their entire educational experience as good or excellent as follows: 79% in
2 The	
  Higher	
  Education	
  and	
  Training	
  Authority,	
  Further	
  Education	
  and	
  Training	
  Authority,	
  Irish	
  Universities	
  Quality	
  Board	
  and	
  the	
  National	
  
Qualifications	
  Agency.
3 QQI’s	
  undertook	
  a	
  ‘Review	
  of	
  Reviews’	
  in	
  2013/14	
  and	
  published	
  it’s	
  new	
  policy	
  for	
  cyclical	
  review	
  of	
  HEIs	
  in	
  February	
  2016	
  with	
  the	
  first	
  HEI	
  
scheduled	
  to	
  undergo	
  this	
  new	
  review	
  process	
  in	
  August	
  2016.
4 It	
  should	
  be	
  noted	
  that	
  the	
  author	
  worked	
  with	
  the	
  Higher	
  Education	
  and	
  Training	
  Authority	
  in	
  2008	
  on	
  the	
  design	
  of	
  the	
  institutional	
  review	
  
process	
  for	
  the	
  Institute	
  of	
  Technology	
  Sector,	
  howeeer	
  she	
  was	
  not	
  involved	
  in	
  it’s	
  roll-‐out	
  and	
  did	
  not	
  participate	
  on	
  any	
  of	
  the	
  review	
  panels	
  
under	
  consideration	
  in	
  this	
  paper.	
  
5 The author worked in the Higher Education And Training Authority for nine months in 2008 on the institutional review project.
6	
  This	
  included	
  summary	
  reports,	
  extended	
  reports	
  and	
  follow	
  up	
  actions	
  reports.	
  	
  
7 www.studentsurvey.ie
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2013; 78% in 2014 and 78% in 2015. This suggests that students were insulated to some degree
against the worst of the funding cuts.
It is difficult to interpret these results as a baseline to compare with pre-crisis levels is not available,
nor is it easy to make direct comparisons with international systems such as the NSSE in the US,
AUSSE in Australia etc. Students are at an inherent disadvantage as commentators on the quality of
their learning experience in that, as they move from year, they don’t know what the previous cohort
experienced and don’t have a ready comparator with respect to programme quality, though Student’s
Unions, external examiners and employers can provide some continuity year on year. Employer
satisfaction with graduate skills also remains high at 72% satisfaction (IBEC, 2015).
6.International Higher Education Ranking systems
In 2008 seven Irish universities and the Dublin Institute of Technology were ranked in the top 400 of
the Times Higher Education Rankings with Trinity College Dublin in the Top 50 and University
College Dublin in the top 100. Both Trinity College Dublin and University College Dublin lost their
place in the top 100 in 2011 and the top ranked Irish institution TCD has fallen to 160 in 2015 (THE,
2015). While international ranking systems arguably reflect the research mission more than the
teaching mission they do provide an objective assessment, external to all actors in the Irish higher
education sector.
7. Institutional Responses to funding reductions
Organisational resilience is concerned with the adaptive capacity of organisations and their ability to
address uncertainty in internal and external environments (Gibson and Tarrant, 2010). In the face of an
impending financial crisis it is important to note there are limits to the choices available to HEIs (at
least initially). HEIs are contracted to deliver programmes to students already enrolled and to deliver
on commitments to external funding agencies for research and other projects. A high percentage of a
HEI’s costs are fixed in the pay budget for permanent staff, therefore cost reduction options tend to
centre on the non-pay budget, non-replacement of contract staff and retirees and if available,
redundancy and/or redeployment schemes.
It is also important to note that there is a latency period after which funding reductions are signaled,
first introduced and before they take effect. The initial reaction across the Irish public service in 2008
was to ‘freeze the status quo’ through a complete moratorium on public sector recruitment. This took
effect in the ‘Initial Impact’ phase in 2009/10. For example, UCD and DIT lost over 5% of its teaching
staff between 2009 and 2010. The system ‘shuddered’ in 2009/10 and it can be argued that the
‘managed decline’ took effect from 2010/11 onwards. HEIs had most flexibility to make cutbacks to
discretionary activity (e.g. new developments) and it is possible that only when these opportunities
were exhausted that core operational commitments were impacted. Additional teaching hours were
injected into the 2012/13 through a public sector productivity agreement, which saw existing lecturers
delivering approximately 10% more teaching hours. This may have softened the impact of cutbacks to
the teaching mission.
An initial attempt by the author to categories the impact of reductions in core staffing and non-pay
budgets is given Table 3 (influenced by a taxonomy of proximal and distal outcomes from (Pollitt &
Bouckaert, 2004)). Operational impacts are defined as core provision where commitments already
exist (e.g. academic programmes with intakes already enrolled). Strategic impacts are defined as
discretionary activities where the Institution has a choice to continue, discontinue, scale back or not
embark upon the activity in the first instance.
7.1 Operational Impacts
When funding cuts are implemented, there are options at programme level to reduce the number of
optional module, reduce individual staff/student supervision ratios or revert to less expensive delivery
models (e.g. ‘chalk and talk’ over problem-based learning). At the level of the academic department,
options include postponing strategic developments, prioritising teaching over research or combining
class groups. Academic departments may pursue alternative sources of funding (e.g. special schemes,
4
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skills shortages, international students) regardless of whether this fits with their core mission or decide
to enroll more students if the internal reward system incentivises this. Noting that Institutions have
discretion internally in relation to how they allocate the core grant, institutional responses to funding
cuts will vary. It is worth noting that a high percentage of a HEI’s costs are fixed around in the pay
budget for permanent staff. Adjustments can usually only be made within a small percentage of overall
budget (e.g. contract staff, non-pay). Institutions have little flexibility to move staff from areas in
decline to areas in demand (e.g. architects moving to ICT programmes) however it can be argued that
this is an opportune time to up skill staff in a second discipline to enable true interdisciplinary
approaches to teaching and research. Internally, from a non-pay perspective, HEIs may opt to share the
pain across their constituency; using percentage based cutbacks across all departments, rather than take
strategic decisions to reduce intakes/eliminate provision.
One of the few independent insights into impacts of funding reductions at operational level comes
from a report commissioned by QQI late in 2015. This analysed the internal review reports of
academic programmes and departments conducted by HEIs themselves during the 2008-2015 period.
Unlike the institutional review reports, key findings included (i) a significant number and nature of
references to the funding environment (ii) the impact of staffing reductions on staff workloads,
reduced promotional opportunities, reduced staff development opportunities and tensions between
teaching and research (iii) the perceived impacts on the student learning experience and (iv) reduced
resources for the teaching and learning environment. The report states that “some units have reached a
‘tipping point’ where continued cuts/reductions may have serious and irretrievable implications for
future sustainability” (QQI, 2015).
7.2 Strategic Impacts
Despite the constraints HEIs operate within, it can be argued that Institutional responses during the
2008-2015 period contributed to the pressure they found themselves under. When budget is allocated
based on student numbers, if the overall financial stability of the Institution is threatened, there is a
temptation to enroll more students, particularly in popular areas which are arguably already under
pressure from a growth trajectory. Most HEI’s responded to the crisis by increasing enrolments. Some
evidence can be found for a lack of strategic decisions in the fact that while growth in demographics is
anticipated no cap on the number of higher education places available at system-level has been
introduced or any attempt to streamline places by discipline (though some skills shortage areas have
been incentivized). For example an analysis of Central Application Office (CAO) data across the Irish
Universities and DIT between 2008 and 2015 demonstrates that there are no seismic shifts in the
number or nature of the programmes offered.
7.3 Strategic Trajectory
What is also remarkable is that, having survived the ‘managed decline’ period, with access to their
internal academic unit reports and in the full knowledge that the funding environment was unlikely to
improve in the foreseeable future, many HEIs agreed ambitious targets with the HEA through the
strategic dialogue process introduced in 2013/14. The HEIs considered in this study for example all
agreed to increase new entrants, setting targets of between 4% and 20% of 2014 levels by 2016, as part
of their compacts with the HEA. There are echoes of the lack of prioritisation found in the strategic
planning processes in place in Irish HEIs in the past decade (Lillis & Lynch, 2014).
Furthermore, several Institutes of Technology embarked on expensive trajectories to become
Technological Universities (CIT, IT Tralee, DIT, ITB and ITT) and were facilitated in doing so by the
funding agency (HEA). Challenging targets have been set for TU status, most notably in the
percentage of PhD students. These Institutes did not increase their share of the competitive national
research funding budget to a level commensurate with meeting these PhD targets through external
funding. To achieve these TU targets therefore many have invested significantly in internal funding for
PhD students by diverting resources from the teaching mission. Project teams for TU projects were
also established in some Institutions, further diluting the budget available for the teaching mission.
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8. Conclusions
The Irish University Association (IUA) asks a key question however “to what extent has the crisis
been masked due to the duration of the educational cycle…where entrants take several years to enter
the workforce?” (IUA, 2014). Ireland had a well regarded higher education system in 2008 and it still
has a well regarded higher education system in 2015 by international standards.
The anomaly is that staff views, as expressed through reviews of academic units, run contrary to
student and employer views and both student satisfaction and employer satisfaction have remained
high. When funding cuts were introduced HEIs had most flexibility to make cutbacks to discretionary
activity linked to strategic developments and it is possible therefore that it is only when these
opportunities are exhausted that core operational commitments were impacted. It is possible that the
cushion of additional teaching hours through a public sector productivity agreement in 2012 and the
additional efforts made by teaching staff (QQI, 2015) have insulated the teaching mission from the
worst of the cutbacks. However the true cost, in terms of staff morale and increased stress over a
sustained period is unknown. Ireland’s staff: student ratio, now at 1:19, is well above the OECD
average and top internationally ranked universities of 1:12 (HEA, 2015). Long-fingering staff
continuing professional development, postponing strategic developments, new programme
developments and prioritising teaching over research means that Irish HEIs may have lost significant
momentum.
Two chasms appear to be opening up, one between the operational reality of academic units and their
institutional leadership and the second between HEIs and the funding agency and other stakeholders.
Institutional leadership had full sight of the reviews of their academic units, and full knowledge of
their funding environments. They had a choice as to whether to listen to the warning signals when
agreeing their strategic trajectories with the HEA and deciding to pursue technological university
status.
The quality framework, relying as it does on institutional review, even if it had been implemented in
full, may not be fit for purpose. International ranking systems however provided an annual reminder to
the guardians of the sector that all is not well. In their defence these agencies themselves were caught
up in the uncertainties of the environment but monitoring actual quality did not appear to be a priority.
While the pursuit of mergers for the purposes of rationalisation is understandable, the wisdom of
entertaining expensive technological university projects at a time when the sector is already stressed
must be questioned.
While a capital investment may remedy classroom conditions and outdated equipment, the underlying
structural damage may be far more difficult to remedy. The lighthouse that is Irish Higher Education
may have weathered the storm and with only minor surface cracks evident. The system may
congratulate itself on its ‘managed decline’ and lack of ‘serious issues with quality’ but now that the
storm is abating maybe it is time to assess the structural damage?
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Appendix 1 Tables
Table 2
Taxonomy of Result Types (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004)
Examples adapted for Higher Education by the author
Result Type
Operational

Level
1

Process

2

Capacity

3

Ideological

4

Description
Discrete and quantifiable results, efficiency measures. Examples include : objectives with
targets relating to student numbers; Retention rates, specific resources/facilities, targeted
marketing initiatives; Development of new courses; Implement specific initiative (e.g
schools visit programme)
Improved management or decision making processes which are linked directly to actual
improvements. Examples include : developing links for specified purpose (e.g. teacher
training, assisting schools with specified projects); Introducing change to organizational
structure (e.g. new position created for specific purpose); Developing and implementing a
strategy/plan for a specific functional area (e.g. develop marketing plan);
Encourage/facilitate staff to participate in research/consultancy, improve conditions;
Ensuring equitable workload for students; Investigate new markets/new area (e.g. funding);
Course development strategy in new area (without specific programmes identified e.g.
Education)
Systems level outcomes which enhance the capacity of the organisation. Examples include
continued development of some activity without specified outcomes (e.g. Developing links
& partnerships, improving quality/overall student experience, encouraging teaching
excellence, encourage business startups). Change in organizational culture (e.g. managing in
more open and consistent manner, or more effective and efficient manner); Development of
centre of excellence; Contribute to national policy etc.
Movement of organisation toward desired or ideal state. Clearly intangible but desirable
states (e.g. total quality culture in all operations, foster an entrepreneurial ethos, enhance
standing as a contributor to regional development)

Table 3 Examples of Operational and Strategic Impacts at different levels within a HEI
(Source: Author)
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Appendix 2 Figures

Figure 1 Trends on Student Numbers and Income per student 2007/08 to 2015/16 (HEAa, 2015).

Figure 2 Trends on Student Numbers and Staffing Levels 2007/08 to 2012/13 (HEAa, 2015)
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